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Key Rate Available from Mismatched Mesurements in the
BB84 Protocol and the Uncertainty Principle∗
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SUMMARY We consider the mismatched measurements in
the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, in which measur-
ing bases are different from transmitting bases. We give a lower
bound on the amount of a secret key that can be extracted from
the mismatched measurements. Our lower bound shows that
we can extract a secret key from the mismatched measurements
with certain quantum channels, such as the channel over which
the Hadamard matrix is applied to each qubit with high probabil-
ity. Moreover, the entropic uncertainty principle implies that one
cannot extract the secret key from both matched measurements
and mismatched ones simultaneously, when we use the standard
information reconciliation and privacy amplification procedure.
key words: BB84, mismatched measurement, quantum key dis-
tribution
1. Introduction
The BB84 protocol [1] is one of the most-known pro-
tocols for quantum key distribution. In this proto-
col, the sender, Alice, sends qubits in one of four
quantum state vectors |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2,
|−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2, where {|0〉, |1〉} forms an or-
thonormal basis. Then the receiver, Bob, measures the
received qubits with either {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} ba-
sis. After that, Alice publicly announces to which {|0〉,
|1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} basis each qubit belong. Bob discard
the measurement outcomes whose bases do not contain
the transmitted qubit. We call such measurement mis-
matched measurement in this paper. After that, Alice
and Bob perform the information reconciliation and the
privacy amplification to obtain the same secret key as
described in [12].
As far as the authors know, there is no literature
that clarifies the amount of key that can be extracted
from mismatched measurements in the BB84 protocol,
though Pawlowski [10] studied the same problem with
a protocol completely different from the BB84. The ef-
ficiency of a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol
is measured by the ratio of extracted bits of secret key
per remaining bits not disclosed nor discarded, which is
called key rate. We shall show a lower bound on the key
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rate that can be extracted from mismatched measure-
ments in the BB84 protocol. Moreover, we shall show
that, when we use the standard information reconcil-
iation and privacy amplification in [12] and the well-
known lower bound on the key rate [4], the entropic
uncertainty principle [8] implies that one cannot ex-
tract the secret key from both matched measurements
and mismatched ones simultaneously.
The reader may think that the probability of get-
ting the measurement outcome |+〉 is always 0.5 when
the transmitted qubit is |0〉, and considering mis-
matched measurement outcomes is useless and non-
sense. We cannot extract a secret key from mismatched
measurement outcomes when such a probability is 0.5.
However, consider the quantum channel over which the
Hadamard matrix is applied to each qubit with high
probability. With such a quantum channel the above
probability is close to 0 or 1. The lower bound ob-
tained in this paper shows that we can extract a secret
key from mismatched measurement outcomes with such
a quantum channel.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents a variant of the BB84 protocol. Section 3 veri-
fies its unconditional security and shows a lower bound
on its key rate. Section 4 shows that the lower bounds
on the key rates available from matched measurements
and mismatched ones cannot be simultaneously pos-
itive, by using the entropic uncertainty principle [8].
Section 5 gives concluding remarks and lists several
open research questions.
2. Protocol
In this section, we shall show a variant of the BB84 pro-
tocol that tries to extract secret key from mismatched
measurement outcomes. We define the matrices X and
Z representing the bit error and the phase error, re-
spectively, as
X |0〉 = |1〉, X |1〉 = |0〉,
Z|+〉 = |−〉, Z|−〉 = |+〉.
1. Alice makes a random qubit sequence according
to the i.i.d. uniform distribution on {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉,
|−〉} and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob chooses the {|0〉, |1〉} basis or {|+〉, |−〉} basis
uniformly randomly for each received qubit and
measure it by the chosen basis.
2
IEICE TRANS. FUNDAMENTALS, VOL.E91–A, NO.10 OCTOBER 2008
3. Alice publicly announces which basis {|0〉, |1〉} or
{|+〉, |−〉} each transmitted qubit belongs to. Bob
also publicly announces which basis was used for
measurement of each qubit. In the following steps
they will only consider qubits with which trans-
mission basis and measuring bases do not coincide
between Alice and Bob.
4. Suppose that there are 2n qubits transmitted in
the {|0〉, |1〉} basis and measured with the {|+〉,
|−〉} basis by Bob. Index those qubits by 1, . . . ,
2n. Define the bit ai = 0 if Alice’s i-th qubit was
|0〉, and ai = 1 otherwise. Define the bit bi = 0
if Bob’s measurement outcome for i-th qubit was
|+〉, and bi = 1 otherwise.
5. Suppose also that there are 2n′ qubits transmitted
in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis and measured with the {|0〉,
|1〉} basis by Bob. Index those qubits by 1, . . . ,
2n′. Define the bit αi = 0 if Alice’s i-th qubit was
|+〉, and αi = 1 otherwise. Define the bit βi = 0
if Bob’s measurement outcome for i-th qubit was
|0〉, and βi = 1 otherwise.
For the simplicity of the presentation, we shall describe
the procedure extracting the secret key from ai and bi.
The key rate for αi, βi will turn out to be the same
as that for ai, bi at the end of Section 3.2. In the
following steps, the half of measurement outcomes will
be disclosed and used for estimation of error rates qX
and qZ . The amount of disclosure can be arbitrarily
chosen provided that the estimation of error rates can
be done sufficiently accurately.
6. Alice chooses a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , 2n} with size
|S| = n uniformly randomly from subsets of {1,
. . . , 2n}, and publicly announces the choice of S.
Alice and Bob publicly announce ai and bi for i ∈ S
and compute the error rate
qX =
|{i ∈ S | ai 6= bi}|
|S| . (1)
7. Alice chooses a subset S′ ⊂ {1, . . . , 2n′} with size
|S′| = n′ uniformly randomly from subsets of {1,
. . . , 2n′}, and publicly announces the choice of S′.
Alice and Bob publicly announce αi and βi for i ∈
S′ and compute the error rate
qZ =
|{i ∈ S′ | αi 6= βi}|
|S′| . (2)
8. Alice and Bob decide a linear code C1 of length
n such that its decoding error probability is suffi-
ciently small over all the binary symmetric channel
whose crossover probability is close to qX . Let H1
be a parity check matrix for C1, ~a be Alice’s re-
maining (not announced) bits among ai’s, and ~b
be Bob’s remaining bits among bi’s.
9. Alice publicly announces the syndrome H1~a.
10. If qX > 0.5 then Bob negates every bit in ~b before
executing the following steps.
11. Bob compute the error vector ~f such that H1 ~f =
H1~b−H1~a by the decoding algorithm for C1. With
high probability ~b − ~f = ~a.
12. Alice chooses a subspace C2 ⊂ C1 with dimC2 =
nh(qZ) uniformly randomly, where h denotes the
binary entropy function, and publicly announces
her choice of C2. The final shared secret key is the
coset ~a+ C2.
When measuring bases are the same as the trans-
mitting bases, we can use the standard BB84 protocol.
Thus, we discard no measurement outcome when we
combine the above protocol with the standard BB84.
3. Security proof and a lower bound on the key
rate
We shall verify the unconditional security of our pro-
posed protocol by directly relating it to the quantum
error correction by the quantum CSS (Calderbank-
Shor-Steane) codes [2], [13]. To make this paper self-
contained, we shall briefly review the CSS code. After
that we shall relate our variant of the BB84 protocol
to the CSS code in a similar way to Shor and Preskill
[12].
3.1 Review of the CSS code
For a binary vector ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Fn2 , where
F2 is the Galois field with two elements, we define the
quantum state vector |~v〉 by
|~v〉 = |v1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |vn〉.
For two binary linear codes C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 , the CSS
code is the complex linear space spanned by the vectors
1√
|C2|
∑
~w∈C2
|~v + ~w〉,
for all ~v ∈ C1. We also need parameterized CSS codes
introduced in [12]. The parameterized CSS code for
~x, ~z ∈ Fn2 is defined as the linear space spanned by
1√
|C2|
∑
~w∈C2
(−1)(~z, ~w)|~x+ ~v + ~w〉, (3)
for all ~v ∈ C1, where (·, ·) denotes the inner product.
3.2 Security proof and analysis of the key rate
We shall first show that our protocol is equivalent to
sending a parameterized CSS codeword with the pa-
rameter ~z randomly chosen. If we fix ~v and ~x and
choose ~z uniformly randomly in Eq. (3), then the re-
sulting density operator is
1
2n|C2|
∑
~z∈Fn
2

 ∑
~w1∈C2
(−1)(~z, ~w1)|~x+ ~v + ~w1〉


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
 ∑
~w2∈C2
(−1)(~z, ~w2)〈~x+ ~v + ~w2|


=
1
|C2|
∑
~w∈C2
|~x+ ~v + ~w〉〈~x + ~v + ~w|, (4)
by the exactly same argument as [12].
Denote the right hand side of Eq. (4) by ρ(~x,~v).
By a straightforward computation we can see
1
2n|C1|
∑
~x∈Fn
2
∑
~v∈C1
ρ(~x,~v) =
1
2n
∑
~a∈Fn
2
|~a〉〈~a|. (5)
The right hand side of Eq. (5) means sending |0〉 or |1〉
n times with equal probability, which is exactly what
Alice is doing in our protocol. Announcing the syn-
drome H1~a in Step 9 is equivalent to announcing which
~x is chosen.
Consider the Hadamard matrix H defined by
H |0〉 = |+〉 and H |1〉 = |−〉. Consider the memoryless
quantum channel Γ over which the error HX occurs
with probability rX , HZ occurs with probability rZ ,
HXZ occurs with probability rXZ , and H occurs with
probability 1 − rX − rZ − rXZ , with qX = rX + rXZ
and qZ = rZ+rXZ . The qubits received by Bob can be
regarded as the output of Γ when Alice sends |0〉 and
|1〉 with equal probability, which is equivalent to send-
ing a quantum codeword in the CSS code as described
above.
If we apply H−1 to each qubit, then the quan-
tum channel can be regarded as causing the X error
with probability rX , the Z error with probability rZ ,
and the XZ error with probability rXZ . Therefore,
if we use the standard decoding procedure of the CSS
code after applying H−1 to each qubit in the received
codeword, then the transmitted CSS codeword is re-
covered with high fidelity provided that qX < 0.5 and
qZ < 0.5. Observe also that this imaginary quantum
decoding process is equivalent to what is actually per-
formed in our variant of the BB84 protocol described
in Section 2 by the almost same argument as [12].
When qX > 0.5 and qZ < 0.5, applying X to each
qubit in the received codeword after H−1 makes qX to
1 − qX and leaves qZ unchanged. When qX < 0.5 and
qZ > 0.5, apply Z to each qubit, and when qX > 0.5
and qZ > 0.5, apply XZ. By the above operations we
can regard both qX and qZ being less than 0.5 provided
that qX 6= 0.5 and qZ 6= 0.5. Observe that application
of Z is purely imaginary and does not correspond to the
actual operations in the protocol in Section 2. On the
other hand, application of X corresponds to flipping
each bit in Step 10 in our protocol. Application of XZ
is equivalent to that of X in the actual protocol.
We have shown that the procedure in Section 2 can
be regarded as the quantum error correction of the CSS
code over a peculiar quantum channel Γ. It was shown
in Corollary 2 of [3] that there exists a linear code C1
of information rate 1 − h(qX) satisfying the condition
in Step 8. If we use such C1 then we can correct HX
errors on Γ with high probability.
It is stated in [12] and proved in [14] that random
choice of [n − nh(qZ)]-dimensional subspace C2 in C1
almost always gives the low phase error decoding prob-
ability in the standard CSS decoding procedure. This
implies that randomly chosen [n−nh(qZ)]-dimensional
subspace C2 in C1 can almost always correct HZ er-
rors on Γ. Therefore, if the choice of C1 is appropri-
ate, then the fidelity of quantum error correction in
the imaginary transmission of the CSS codeword (3)
over the channel Γ is close to 1, which implies that the
eavesdropper Eve can obtain little information by the
same argument as [5], which shows the security of the
BB84 protocol directly relating it to the quantum er-
ror correction without use of entanglement distillation
argument.
Therefore, we can extract 1− h(qX)− h(qZ) bit of
secret key from one bit of the raw bits ~a. With a similar
argument, we can also see that the key rate available
from αi’s is 1 − h(qX) − h(qZ). Because with the key
rate from αi’s the roles of qX and qZ are interchanged,
which does not change the key rate 1− h(qX)− h(qZ).
4. Implication by the uncertainty principle
At the end of Section 2, we stated that we try to extract
a secret key from both matched measurement outcomes
and mismatched ones. In this section, we shall consider
the relation between the amount of secret key extracted
from matched measurement outcomes and that from
mismatched ones. We shall show that we cannot ex-
tract secret key from both matched and mismatched
measurement outcomes by the entropic version [8] of
the uncertainty principle, when we use the information
reconciliation and privacy amplification in [12] and the
lower bound on its key rate in [4]. Note that Koashi
already used the uncertainty principle for security anal-
ysis of QKD protocols [6].
Maassen and Uffink [8] (see also Box 11.1 of [9])
proved the following version of uncertainty principle in
terms of the Shannon entropy. Let ρ be a density oper-
ator of a qubit. Let P01 (resp. P+−) be the probability
distribution of the measurement outcome by measuring
ρ by {|0〉, |1〉} (resp. {|+〉, |−〉}). Let H(·) denotes the
Shannon entropy. Then we have H(P01)+H(P+−) ≥ 1
as described at Eq. (11.3) in [9], where the entropy is
counted in the unit of bits.
Let Γ be the memoryless quantum channel that
represents Eve’s manipulation and the channel noise
between Alice and Bob. Γ is a map between density
operators. Define
pX− = 〈+|Γ(|−〉〈−|)|+〉,
pX+ = 〈−|Γ(|+〉〈+|)|−〉,
qX1 = 〈+|Γ(|1〉〈1|)|+〉,
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qX0 = 〈−|Γ(|0〉〈0|)|−〉,
pZ1 = 〈0|Γ(|1〉〈1|)|0〉,
pZ0 = 〈1|Γ(|0〉〈0|)|1〉,
qZ− = 〈0|Γ(|−〉〈−|)|0〉,
qZ+ = 〈1|Γ(|+〉〈+|)|1〉.
Observe that qX = (qX0 + qX1)/2 and qZ = (qZ+ +
qZ−)/2, where qX and qZ are as defined in Eqs. (1) and
(2).
Define pX = (pX+ + pX−)/2 and pZ = (pZ0 +
pZ1)/2. Observe that pZ (resp. pX) is the error rate of
the matched measurement in the BB84 protocol when
transmitting basis is {|0〉, |1〉} (resp. {|+〉, |−〉}). The
lower bound on key rate of the plain one-way postpro-
cessing described in [12] is given by 1− h(pX)− h(pZ)
[4].
From the entropic uncertainty principle reviewed
at the beginning of this section, we have
h(pX+) + h(qZ+) ≥ 1, (6)
h(pX−) + h(qZ−) ≥ 1, (7)
h(pZ0) + h(qX0) ≥ 1, (8)
h(pZ1) + h(qX1) ≥ 1. (9)
By the concavity of the entropy function
h(pX) = h
(
pX+ + pX−
2
)
≥ h(pX+) + h(pX−)
2
, (10)
h(qZ) = h
(
qZ+ + qZ−
2
)
≥ h(qZ+) + h(qZ−)
2
, (11)
h(pZ) = h
(
pZ0 + pZ1
2
)
≥ h(pZ0) + h(pZ1)
2
, (12)
h(qX) = h
(
qX0 + qX1
2
)
≥ h(qX0) + h(qX1)
2
. (13)
Applying Eqs. (10) and (11) to the sum of Eqs. (6) and
(7) divided by two, we obtain
h(pX) + h(qZ) ≥ 1. (14)
From Eqs. (8, 9, 12, 13) in a similar manner we obtain
h(pZ) + h(qX) ≥ 1. (15)
Equations (14) and (15) imply
[1 − h(pX)− h(pZ)] + [1− h(qX)− h(qZ)] ≤ 0. (16)
The first term in Eq. (16) is the lower bound on key
rate of the matched measurement in the BB84 proto-
col, while the second term is that of the mismatched
measurement. Equation (16) means that both lower
bounds on key rates cannot be simultaneously positive.
5. Concluding remarks
We proposed a variant of the BB84 protocol that ex-
tracts secret key from measurement outcomes with
which measuring bases are different from transmitting
bases, obtained a lower bound on the key rate which has
a similar form to that of the standard BB84 protocol,
and verified its unconditional security. After that, we
showed that the lower bounds on the key rates available
from matched and mismatched measurements cannot
be simultaneously positive.
Our result generates a number of interesting re-
search questions. Firstly, the well-known upper bound
(Table I in [4]) on the key rates of the BB84 proto-
col [12] is expressed in terms of error rates for matched
measurements with which measuring bases are the same
as the transmitting bases. If both error rates for the
matched bases are 0.5, for example the Hadamard ma-
trix is applied to every qubit, then those upper bounds
state that we cannot extract secret key. However, our
proposed variant of the BB84 protocol can extract se-
cret key in such case. It is desirable to have an upper
bound on the amount of available secret key taking into
account mismatched measurement in the BB84 proto-
col.
Secondly, we could not disprove the possibility that
we can extract secret key from both matched and mis-
matched measurements by more sophisticated postpro-
cessing of the BB84 protocol such as Refs. [4], [7], [11],
[15]. It is desirable to prove or disprove such possibility.
Thirdly, in the standard BB84 protocol, it is gen-
erally believed that we can postprocess bits transmit-
ted by {|0〉, |1〉} basis and {|+〉, |−〉} basis separately
without decreasing the key rate. The proposed vari-
ant of the BB84 protocol separately postprocess bits
obtained by matched measurements and mismatched
ones, because the matched measurement outcomes are
processed with the standard BB84 protocol separately.
It is not clear whether or not such separate processing
of matched and mismatched measurement outcomes de-
creases the total amount of secret key. We leave these
questions as future research agenda.
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